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In this paper we provide new estimates of this elasticity for the case of Army reenlistment at the end of first and second terms of service.
Compared to the past literature on this topic, the major contribution of our study is to provide estimates of a dynamic reenlistment model adapted from the literature on stochastic dynamic programming models (for surveys, see Eckstein and Wolpin, 1989 and Rust, 1991) . The retention decision is inherently dynamic because the enlistee reaching the end of a term must consider the alternative future streams of income that would obtain if he were to stay in the military and if he were to leave.
Most past studies of military retention have instead obtained estimates
from what is called the Annualized Cost of Leaving, or "ACOL," model (e.g., Warner and Goldberg, 1984) . This model, which we discuss in more detail in our paper, is a simplified version of the traditional dynamic programming model which imposes certain restrictions on the form of uncertainty, restrictions that are difficult to reconcile with standard assumptions of time consistency. The model has also been applied to the study of the effects of pensions on retirement by Stock and Wise (1990) , who use a related version of the ACOL model which we call the "TCOL" model. The major advantage claimed for the ACOL model is its computational simplicity, an argument buttressed by the study of Götz and McCall (1984) . Götz 
and McCall estimated a dynamic
Programming model of Air Force officer retention but found the estimation to be sufficiently difficult that only three parameters could be estimated, no exogenous covariates were allowed, the discount rate was fixed a priori, and no standard errors were calculated.
In our paper we show that dynamic retention models are considerably less difficult to estimate than this literature implies. At least for the case of a simple leave-stay decision-the case with the smallest possible state space--we show that the retention decision is a linear function of a simple weighted sum of current and future wage differences. While the solution'requires backwards recursion, the recursion formula is of a very simple form. We report estimates of a model with eleven parameters, seven exogenous covariates, and an estimated discount rate, with standard errors for all parameters.
In addition, we permit unobserved heterogeneity in the form of a random individual effect.
The results show strong effects on retention of the military-civilian income differential over the lifetime and of the timing of that differential with the date of departure from the military. Military retirement benefits are found to be particularly important.
In addition, our model is found to be superior to the ACOL and TCOL models in some respects. While our model does not provide a better in-sample fit than those models (all have approximately the same fit), our model yields very accurate out-of-sample predictions.
In addition, our estimated dynamic programming model provides more plausible predictions of the effects of some changes in military pay policy than do the ACOL model and its variants.
In particular, we use our model to simulate the effect of recently-announced Army policies aimed at reducing reenlistment rates.
In the first section of the paper we lay out our dynamic retention model. Following that, we compare our model to those in the past literature, particularly the ACOL model. The subsequent section reports our data and results, and a final section provides a summary.
II. A DYNAMIC RETENTION MODEL
Consider an Army enlistee at time "t", at the end of a term of service, considering whether to leave the military for the civilian sector or to reenlist.
1
Assume that he cannot return to the military if he leaves and that future income streams and the time horizon are known with certainty.
Let W™ be the military compensation at time r-including basic military pay 7"
and bonuses-and let W C be civilian compensation (including military T retirement pay). Letting "L" denote the choice to leave, "S" denote the choice to stay, and V denote the present value of the alternatives, we have: 
V fc+1 = Max(v£ +1 ,vJ +1 , c rn where T is the time horizon, ß is the discount rate, and e fc and e fc are sources of uncertainty. We assume that the individual knows the distribution function for the error terms as well as their current values but not their actual future values, apart from an individual effect we specify below. The optimal nature and internal consistency of the decision process assumed is reflected in equation (3), showing that current decisions are based on the assumption of optimal future decisions and that both are governed by the same valuation L S process. The individual leaves if V" t is greater than V fc .
This simple dynamic programming model has a clear and intuitive solution.
Solving (2) forward to T, the model can be reformulated as follows:
2, where, assuming e -N(0,a £ ) and letting f and F be the standard normal p.d.f. and cd.f., respectively,
(8)
The reenlistment decision is thus based on the linear index function shown in (5), which is a function of a nonstochastic component a t and an error term.
The latter is a difference between the military and civilian errors, as shown in (6), and the former is a weighted sum of current and future compensation differences plus a remainder, as shown in (7). Each of the future compensation differences is weighted by the discount rate and by a term x^, which is the probability that the individual will not have left by time r. These probabilities will be critical in the discussion of different estimation procedures below. The remainder is a sum of expected values of truncated L S error terms, since the individual always picks the maximum of V fc and V fc and hence has an above-zero expected value of e. . Estimation of the model in this form is not difficult. It is a probit model in which the parameters ß and a £ enter the right-hand-side of (7) nonlinearly, both explicitly as well as implicitly in the r f . The r f must be computed by backwards recursion, but the recursion formula is just (9) with (7) substituted in for future a k -No difficult calculations are involved in computing the values of all r f in this way.
Standard errors can be obtained from either analytic or numerical derivatives of (7) and (9). periods other than the end points of fixed terms, we shall assume instead that the decision points occur only every few years, depending on the length of term (we provide exact details of these lengths in our data discussion below).
We shall therefore assume that there are n discrete decision points, which occur at times t., i=l,2,...,n.
With these complications the model becomes When we add the two random effects to the two wages and rederive the form of the model, the result is identical to that in equations (15)- (21) except that XÖ in (18) is replaced by X5+( 7 /^£). Hence 7 is involved in all terms of (17) and (18), including the r k -To avoid confusion, we also replace
to show the dependence of a on 7 explicitly, the probability of observing i two successive decisions is CO f Prob(S 1 ,S 2 ) = Prob(S.j7) Prob(S 2 J7) 9(7) <*7 ( 24 3 where g is the density function of 7 and where Prob(S j = l|7)=F[a j (7)/^] and
For individuals who leave at the end of the first term, only Prob(S 1 |7) enters the probit likelihood function.
We assume that 7 -N(0,a ).
s The probability in (24) can be approximated with quadrature methods relatively easily. As a practical matter, since quadrature approximations just involve evaluating the kernel of (24) at several different values of the integrating variable (7), the added computational burden of the model when unobserved heterogeneity is allowed is essentially that required by having to evaluate the single-period dynamic model described above multiple times.
Since the single-period model is not overly burdensome itself, its multiple evaluation is still well within the power of modern computational facilities.
II. COMPARISON WITH ALTERNATIVE MODELS
Our model is a special case of more general dynamic choice models with discrete choice variables (see Eckstein and Wolpin, 1989, and Rust, 1991, for surveys). Our case is a particularly simple one, for the choice of military reenlistment is a simple optimal stopping rule with only a small, finite number of alternatives (specifically, T-t or less). It is the simplicity of the model and the low dimensionality of the state space that permit us the computational flexibility to introduce serial correlation in the error terms through the assumption of unobserved heterogeneity. Virtually all past dynamic choice models have ignored serial correlation for computational reasons.
In the literature on military reenlistment, the closest model to ours is that of Götz and McCall (1984) . Götz Given the obvious arbitrariness of picking the horizon, a preferable model was developed, known as the ACOL (annualized cost of leaving) model (e.g., Warner and Goldberg, 1984) which optimized over that horizon. The ACOL model is the most well-known model in the military retention literature, so we shall exposit it in some detail, and we shall estimate it for comparison with our dynamic model.
We will first demonstrate a variant of the ACOL model which we will call the TCOL (total cost of leaving) model that is closer to our DRM (dynamic retention model). This model is a special case of our dynamic retention model but which treats uncertainty in a different fashion. When expanded, equation (26) can be seen to be identical to equation (7) if r r =l for r<I, where s"=argmax(V st ), and r =0 for T>s, and if the third term in (7) (the sum of truncated expected T normals) is omitted. Thus the TCOL model assumes that the future leaving date (I) is known with certainty, and thus the probability weights r r present in our dynamic retention model do not appear.
7
This has the rather unfortunate consequence that, because future leaving dates other than t+S are assigned probability zero, all changes in future W^ for r>t+I have an identically zero effect on the current retention probability so long as those changes do not affect the value of s. The TCOL model also embodies a form of time inconsistency inasmuch as the current decision is affected by unobservables and transitory shocks (e t ) whose future existence is assumed to be ignored by the individual. considerably from the simple models laid out here-utility differences rather" than income differences are specified and a different error structure is assumed-but the basic dynamic behavioral assumption (of a probability-one optimal future leaving date) is the same as that in the TCOL model.
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However, the model usually estimated in the military retention literature is not the TCOL model but instead the ACOL ("annualized cost of leaving") model (Warner and Goldberg, 1984; Black et al., 1990a; Smith et al., 1991) . In this model, the value of staying in the military for s periods beyond t is assumed to contain the unobserved, individual-specific component 7 which we discussed in the last section:
st r =t r=t+s in this case, since 7 is unobserved, the maximum of (28) 
.S , and insert this into the retention probit instead of P t (V sfc in (30) Unfortunately, the ACOL model has the difficulty that the insertion of the Max condition only after equation (30) is arrived at is not legitimate, for the value of s that maximizes (30) will not maximize the present value of lifetime income.
This can be seen for the case when 7 -0, when (25) applies.
The maximum of (25), which we denoted i previously, will not in general equal the s which maximizes (30). Thus the ACOL and TCOL models do not generate the same optimal leaving date and, since it is presumably the present value of the lifetime income stream that the individual maximizes, the TCOL model is to be preferred to the ACOL model." In addition, the ACOL model has the same knife-edge property as the TCOL model-namely, the lack of responsiveness to changes in future compensation that occur after the maximal leaving date and that do not alter it-as well as the same time-inconsistency property previously discussed for the TCOL model. (28), requires that it affect the optimal leaving date in both the TCOL and ACOL models.
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We will estimate both the TCOL and ACOL models for comparison to our dynamic retention model. To maintain comparability with the military retention literature, we will calculate optimal horizons and the variables P fc and A ignoring 7 and X5, and we will add both linearly to the retention probit.
III. DATA AND RESULTS
As we have noted previously, our study is an examination of the The data set contains 2528 observations on personnel who completed their first terms, and 257 of those were observed again at the end of their second terms.
The first row of Table 1 shows the means of the dependent variable (the retention rate) in our data set. Of the 2528 observations eligible for endof-first-term reenlistment, 33 percent chose to reenlist. Of the 257 observations eligible for second-term reenlistment by the end of our observation period, 63 percent chose to reenlist at the end of their second terms. The higher reenlistment rate at the second term could be partly the result of dynamic selection bias-those with low retention rates may have left at the first term and hence would not be present in the second-term sample.
Our inclusion of the heterogeneity term 7 is intended to capture this effect.
The independent variables are drawn from a data base assembled and provided to us by Smith et al. (1991) . 14 For the X vector we include a number of variables available in the administrative data base: length of initial enlistment term, number of 16 dependents, AFQT score (at enlistment), a race dummy, and entitlement to educational benefits. 15 We also include a dummy variable for whether reenlistment occurred after FY 1983, because reenlistment rates dropped sharply after that date for reasons not related to those in our model.'< Finally, we specify a variable equal to the difference between the individual's pay grade and the average pay grade for enlistees with the same number of years of service in order to capture some differences across individuals in tastes for the military (i.e., those correlated with relative success in the military).
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Means of the independent variables are shown in Table 1 . There are sharp differences in the means between the first-term and second-term samples.
The former have lower military-civilian pay differentials, lower ACOL values, fewer dependents, lower AFQT scores and educational benefits, and are more likely to be white. Although it is tempting to draw immediate inferences from these differences regarding retention effects, the potential for selfselection from unobserved heterogeneity makes such inferences hazardous.
Results. Table 2 shows the results of estimating several different models.
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The first column shows the results for our basic dynamic retention The estimate of ß is .905. This implies a real discount rate of .10 and Notes: Standard errors in parentheses ♦significant at the 10 percent level f-Log LF maximized at interest rate of .14 (.897 = 1/1.14) Log LF maximized at interest rate of .11 (.901 = l/l.ll)
is somewhat lower than estimates used by the Army, which are around .14. The other variables show that retention is more likely, the greater the initial enlistment length, the greater the number of dependents (the military offers special benefits to families), for black enlistees, the greater the pay grade difference, and the lower the educational benefit (since educational benefits encourage enlistees to leave to take advantage of them).^ Column (2) of the table shows estimates of the model with a separate discount rate estimated for retirement-income portion of the military-civilian pay difference and the non-retirement-income portion. This specification was tested to determine the role that retirement pay plays in identifying the discount rate, since past studies have found difficulty in identifying it. The results show that the discount rate on retirement pay is essentially the same as that in column (1) but that the discount rate on other compensation-mostly just future pay--is statistically insignificant. This is not surprising since the future civilian-military pay difference is highly collinear with its current value. We are able to identify the discount rate that applies to retirement pay because our data allow us estimate retirement pay accurately and because our data contain substantial variation in retirement pay independent of current pay. These elasticities, which are evaluated at the sample mean, are quite close to the corresponding relative pay elasticities for the DRM, as should be expected. The magnitudes of the other estimated coefficients are quite different in the TCOL and ACOL models than in the DRM partly because those variables enter differently. While in the TCOL and ACOL models the variables enter linearly as in conventional probit, in the DRM they enter as part of the pay difference in each year in the future and hence have a cumulative impact on current retention (see equation (18)).
Interestingly, the log likelihood values for the TCOL and ACOL models are no worse than, and are in fact slightly greater than, those for the DRM.
Evidently model fit is approximately the same regardless of which model is used. Table 3 , which shows additional measures of goodness-of-fit for the three models, shows a similar result.
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We also estimated a naive retention model with current retention a function only of the current pay difference and the other variables shown in the table. The pay coefficient was much larger (.729) but the model fit was much worse than any of the models shown in Table 2 (log likelihood value of -1668.5). Hence we find that incorporating forward-looking behavior into the model improves fit considerably.
Simulations. Figure 1 shows plots of simulated and actual retention rates up to the 29th year of service. The actual rates are taken from crosssectional retention rates among infantry soldiers by years-of-service in FY 1988 reported by the Army, and hence are out-of-sample. The simulated rates from our DRM should not necessarily match the actual rates because the populations and time periods are different, and because the regressor variables took on different values in the different periods. However, on a priori grounds we should expect them to show the same patterns. Recall that our data only go up through the second term, roughly 6 or 7 years of service, so all simulations beyond that point are extrapolations of our model beyond our data. As the figure shows, the DRM tracks the upward pattern of retention rates fairly well through the 19th year of service. At the 20th year of service, where retirement vesting occurs, the basic DRM predicts a considerably smaller drop than shown in the actual rates. However, the DRM with a separate retirement coefficient shows almost exactly the same drop as Table 4 shows our simulations of the effect of VSI if it were offered in two different ways: (1) if it were offered immediately (i.e., at the current decision point in question) and (2) if it were offered at the next decision point.
In both cases, the VSI is available only at those points, not if departure from the military takes place at any other decision point.
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As the first two columns show, the DRM predicts that retention rates at the first term and at the second term would fall by approximately 3 and 8 percentage points, respectively, if VSI were offered at those decision points. The VSI improves the level of the "civilian" age-income profile and hence reduces retention rates in the Army. The effect is larger at the second term because the magnitude of the VSI payment is larger then, as previously noted. If the VSI were offered at the next decision point (i.e., at the second term for first-termers and at the third term for second-termers), retention rates would rise at both decision points, as shown in the third row of the The remaining columns in Table 4 show the predictions of the TCOL and ACOL models of the same VSI programs. The effect of immediately-offered VSI on retention rates is approximately the same as that predicted by the DRM. In the TCOL and ACOL models, it will be recalled, retention behavior is assumed to be a function of a comparison of expected civilian earnings (if the individual leaves the military immediately) to expected compensation at a single optimal future leaving date. An immediately-offered VSI does not affect the optimal leaving date since that date is chosen over future dates, excluding the current one. But it does affect the civilian earnings profile and hence affects retention in a negative direction.
However, an offer of the VSI as of the next term has virtually no effect on retention rates in either the TCOL or ACOL models, in stark contrast to the predictions of the DRM model. The problem in the TCOL and ACOL -models lies in their assumption that behavior is affected only by a single optimal future leaving date.
In the absence of VSI, over 90 percent of optimal leaving dates are over 20 years-of-service because that is the point of retirement vesting.
The VSI payments, if available at the leaving date only one decision point in the future, are not sufficient in size to move the optimal leaving date up to the VSI point for all but a handful of individuals (less than 1 percent).
Hence the predicted effect of such a VSI is essentially zero, as shown in the Table. Figure 2 In addition, the dynamic retention model we have used is still restrictive in its specification of serial correlation of unobservables and in its assumption of wealth rather than utility maximization. These and other topics provide avenues for future research.
NOTES
1. We have exposited and estimated the one-period version of this model in Daula and Moffitt (1991) . The major difference in the model we provide here is the inclusion of a second period and the consequent provision of unobserved heterogeneity to avoid dynamic selection bias.
2 To solve the model forward requires that we obtain an explicit solution for E (V ) in (2). We can obtain it by recognizing that (3) implies a simple 1 recursion relation in E t (V g ) for all s: With V S -V L =a +e , as shown in equation (5) in the text, the two Prob values above !re S juit normal probabilities evaluated at a g . The expected values of the error terms also solve out, for:
Hence,
f . Thus the equation above can be recursively solved forward lor successive future values of E t (V g ) until s=T, at which point V T+1 =0.
3. We assume that the error term is orthogonal to the regressors, i.e., we assume a random rather than fixed effects model. Fixed effects cannot be consistently estimated in probit models with low numbers of observed time periods.
4. As can be seen from (17) and (18), when r=t j _, the error term in (16), inclusive of 7, is simply £. =J+v . r i 1 5 A normalization is required for probit, as usual, which we accomplish by setting the variance of u t equal to 1. We need estimate only a^, since a £ is calculable as the square root of l+a Z . Note as wel^that £he percent of the total variance explained by the random effect is p=a^/(l+a^).
6. The issues outlined here have been previously discussed in an exchange by Black et al. (1990a Black et al. ( , 1990b and Götz (1990) .
7
Mathematically, the TCOL model replaces the expected value of the maximum of future V by the maximum of the expected values of V. See Stern (1991) t°r a discussion in the issue in the context of the model of Stock and Wise (1990) .
8. Hotz and Miller (forthcoming) and Hotz et al. (forthcoming) have proposed an alternative approach to reducing the computational difficulty of estimating models of this type which requires only initial consistent estimates of the r They use the same representation of the future expected value function as w^'do, as noted earlier, in order to make the r. explicit. This can be thought of as the first step in an iterative procedure in which ML estimates of the full model are achieved. As we noted previously, however, our model is sufficiently simple to compute that we can obtain the fully efficient ML estimates. A rather different approach that also reduces computational burden has been proposed by Manski (1988) . See Eckstein and Wolpin (1989, pp.590-595) for a detailed discussion of both these approaches.
9
The computational simplicity of the dynamic retention model is partly a result of the simple covariance matrix of the errors assumed. However, even the simple covariance matrix is more realistic than the covariance matrix assumed in the TCOL model, which ignores future errors altogether, as just noted.
10
Lumsdaine et al. (1992) compare their model with a simpler version of the dynamic retention model estimated in Daula and Moffitt (1991) . They find that the two models do not differ greatly in fit or in predicted effects of certain types of changes in retirement plans.
11. This ignores 7, however. But our DRM model treats that variable correctly-7 is included for periods when in the military, and not thereafter in that model. 12. In the ACOL model, a linear representation of 7 and X<5 is more consistent since (29) implies that they should enter in that form. Nevertheless, the misplacement of the Max condition in that model will affect those parameter estimates.
13. congress modified the military retirement system in 1985 to provide a reduced benefit for individuals who entered the service after FY85. Our sample does not contain anyone who entered after 1984, however.
14. The different decision intervals over the career may generate heteroskedasticity in the transitory disturbances. However, we ignore this possibility in our estimation.
15. The educational level at enlistment was also tested but its coefficient was insignificant.
16.
In 1983 there was a one-time attempt by the Army to lower reenlistment rates by informal means.
17
We use Army-wide figures for mean pay grade rather than means from our own sample. Also, since this pay-grade variable is potentially endogenous, we also estimate the model without it. We should also note that_we hold the two time-varying variables, pay grade and number of dependents, fixed into the future for the estimation of the model.
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. We estimated the model with Fortran code on a UNISYS 5000, a super-mini at West Point operating under UNIX. The machine took about 450 CPU minutes per iteration, and it took approximately 6 or 7 iterations to achieve convergence, on average. Various system constraints (e.g., inability to hold the data in memory) make these run times considerably higher than could be achieved on high-Derformance machines with adequate disk space that are currently available. We tried a variety of starting values and always obtained 24 the same maximums.
19 Baldwin and Daula (1985) estimated a relative first-term pay elasticity of .40, for example, while Smith et al. (1991) , Warner and Goldberg (1984) , and Hosek and Peterson (1985) estimated first-term military pay elasticities of 1.3, 1.0-2.0, and 3.5, respectively. 20. When the potentially endogenous pay-grade-difference variable is omitted, the estimated parameters shift slightly. The parameter most affected is the standard error of 7, which rises by 20 percent. This is to be expected since the pay grade variable has persistence over time and therefore captures part of the variance of the individual random effect. However, no qualitative aspects of our results are affected by this change.
21. In particular, two different retirement systems were in effect during our observation period (they were calculated differently before and after 1980); differences in promotion rates cause retirement pay to differ for personnel with the same near-term pay; and the value of the annuity received immediately after retirement varies with individual age.
22. The parameter p at the bottom of the columns is the correlation coefficient between the error terms in the retention equations in the two periods estimated with bivariate probit. Bivariate probit is equivalent to probit random effects if there are only two waves in a panel.
23. As noted previously, Lumsdaine et al. (1992) found a similar result for retirement models.
24. The actual VSI in effect restricts eligibility to those with at least seven years of service. Also, it has to be applied for. We ignore these restrictions in order to make the across-model comparisons, including the first-term, reported in the table.
25. To construct the TCOL or ACOL forecasts comparable to Figure 2 would require recalculating optimal leaving dates at every date in the future (each of which requires rechecking all possible future leaving dates at each future date). This is much more cumbersome than in the DRM model, where the distribution of future retention rates requires a single run of the model.
